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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Nancy Felix,
Petitioner/Appellant
v.
Jonathan Sero,

Case No. 20178791-SC

Respondent/Appellee

INTRODUCTION
This case turns on the great import of protecting and preserving the best interests
of children. There are two questions for this Court to determine: (1) the extent to which a
parent’s right to travel should influence a custody determination, and (2) the extent to
which one parent may avoid paying a share of childcare expenses by asserting an
equitable defense of laches. Though both questions implicate the rights and interests of
the parents, this Court’s holding should come down to the best interests of the children.
The case arises from the parties’ performance under a divorce decree and a recent
attempt to modify that divorce decree. Nancy Felix and Jonathan Sero divorced in 2005.
The initial divorce decree granted Mr. Sero sole physical custody of the parties’ two
children, ages one and three at the time. Shortly after the divorce, Ms. Felix began
pursuing a Ph.D. in chemical engineering. In the years that followed, Mr. Sero served
admirably as the children’s primary caregiver and Ms. Felix made the most of her time
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with the children while she continued to invest in their future by securing excellent
childcare and education for the children and by pursuing an advanced degree that would
create vast opportunities for the children.
Ms. Felix earned her Ph.D. in 2015 and subsequently secured an employment
package that promised invaluable educational and experiential opportunities for the
children. Because the position required Ms. Felix to relocate to South Carolina, Ms. Felix
sought to modify the divorce decree to enable her and the children to pursue their new
opportunities in South Carolina. Ms. Felix also sought reimbursement for Mr. Sero’s
unpaid share of the childcare expenses.
The district court did modify the divorce decree because it determined that the
children’s best interests would be served by pursuing the opportunities available to them
in South Carolina. However, the court offered to maintain the existing custody
arrangement if Mr. Sero would move with the children to South Carolina. Mr. Sero
argued that the court had violated his constitutionally protected right to interstate travel,
and the court of appeals agreed. But the panel erred when it held that a custody
determination must weigh the competing constitutional rights of the parents, rather than
prioritizing the best interests of the children.
Regarding the unpaid childcare expenses, the district court concluded that Ms.
Felix’s claim was within the applicable statute of limitation, but that it was barred by the
equitable defense of laches. The court of appeals reluctantly agreed, signaling its belief
that the controlling line of cases had been wrongly decided.

2
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This Court should hold that a custody determination should be based on an
“objective and impartial” determination of the best interests of the children, and that it
likewise serves the best interests of the children to prohibit an equitable defense of laches
against unpaid childcare expenses when the claim is brought within the applicable statute
of limitation. Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 603 (Utah 1989) (providing that a
determination of custody based on the child's best interests is based on an objective and
impartial comparison of the parenting skills, character, and abilities of both parents).
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-3-102(3)(a). This Court also
has jurisdiction under the Utah Child Support Act under Utah Code § 78B-12-110
(“Appeals may be taken from orders and judgments under this chapter as in other civil
actions.”).
ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
Issue 1: Whether the court of appeals erred by holding that a custody determination must
balance the parents’ competing constitutional rights to interstate travel, rather than
prioritizing the best interests of the children.
Standard of Review: This Court reviews de novo a question of whether the district
court applied the correct legal standard. This case raises the question of whether a
unique legal standard applies to custody determinations that may infringe a
parent’s constitutional right to interstate travel and is reviewed de novo, without
deference to the court of appeals. Mawhinney v. City of Draper, 2014 UT 54, ¶ 6,
342 P.3d 262.
3
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Preservation: The panel addressed issue 1 at Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723,
¶¶ 31–42, ---P.3d---. Issue 1 was presented in the questions for certiorari. See
Addenda A; Addenda B.
Issue 2: Whether the court of appeals erred by holding that a party may assert laches to
bar a claim for unpaid childcare expenses when the statute of limitations has not yet
barred the claim and the Legislature has acted to bar similar claims for waiver and
estoppel.
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a decision of the court of appeals for
correctness. Whether laches is available when the applicable statute of limitations
has not expired is a legal question and is reviewed for correctness. Veysey v.
Nelson, 2017 UT App 77, ¶ 14, 397 P.3d 846; Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 52, ¶ 4, 979
P.2d 823.
Preservation: The panel addressed issue 2 at Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723,
¶¶ 43–50, ---P.3d---. Issue 2 was presented in the questions for certiorari. See
Addenda A; Addenda B.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
“In determining any form of custody, including a change in custody, the court
shall consider the best interests of the child . . . .” UTAH CODE § 30-3-10(a).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This case arises from a divorce decree between Ms. Felix and Mr. Sero granting
Mr. Sero sole physical custody of the parties’ two children. (R. ¶ 4). Mr. Sero went above
and beyond in providing excellent care for his and Ms. Felix’s two children for the years
4
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following Mr. Sero and Ms. Felix’s divorce. (R. ¶ 4). However, ten years after the
divorce, Ms. Felix has become a well-respected chemical engineer with a very lucrative
and flexible job offer in South Carolina. (R. ¶ 16). Ms. Felix’s professional opportunity
will enable her to provide for the children in ways that Mr. Sero cannot. (R. ¶ 19).
Specifically, Ms. Felix’s job offer will enable her to spend more time with her children
while providing financial security, access to unrivaled education, and opportunities to
study abroad. (R. ¶ 19). However, Ms. Felix must move to South Carolina to take
advantage of the offer. (R. ¶ 19).
Mr. Sero is aware that allowing the children to relocate to South Carolina with Ms.
Felix will be extremely beneficial for the children: “I understand that this means she’ll
expose our kids to opportunities that I could never give them. Even if the money wasn’t
an issue, it’s a fact of my life that I’m not going to be able to spend weeks at a time with
my kids or put them in private schools . . . or send them to Europe in the summer.”
(R. ¶ 19). Still, Mr. Sero opposes a modified custody determination that will allow the
children to take advantage of those benefits. (R. ¶ 21). Mr. Sero even opposes a custody
determination that will allow him to remain the primary custodian because he is
unwilling to relocate to South Carolina. (R. ¶ 21).
The Initial Divorce Decree
Ms. Felix and Mr. Sero divorced ten years prior to 2015, the year of the original
district court action. (R. ¶ 4). Under the initial divorce decree, Mr. Sero was awarded sole
physical custody of his and Ms. Felix’s children. (R. ¶ 4). In the time since the divorce,
Ms. Felix began investing in the children’s future by pursuing a Ph.D. in chemical
5
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engineering. (R. ¶ 10; ¶ 12). This meant that Ms. Felix had less flexibility and less time to
spend with her children, though Ms. Felix has borne “the lion’s share of costs associated
with child care expenses.” (R. ¶ 3; ¶ 12).
Additionally, though she had less time to devote to childcare, the court below
found that “Ms. Felix’s parenting was ‘outstanding,’ specifically saying that ‘parents who
juggle relationships with their children while pursuing advanced degrees have a uniquely
difficult task in weighing the benefits of being present for day-to-day support against the
value of laying the groundwork for a better future.’” (R. ¶ 12). The court went on to find
that “Ms. Felix exercised good judgment in making those decisions and, despite how
difficult it must have been, gave her children a level of attentiveness and support on par
with a parent with fewer obligations or ambitions.” (R. ¶ 12).
Unpaid Childcare Expenses
After the divorce, Ms. Felix acted to ensure the children had professional childcare
while Ms. Felix was at school or Mr. Sero was at work. (R. ¶ 14). Ms. Felix enrolled the
children in a well-reputed childcare center. (R. ¶ 14). Compared to the children’s
childcare center before the divorce, this childcare center provided a much higher quality
of care, with a more “robust curriculum, smaller classroom sizes . . . and generally had a
better reputation for providing quality childcare.” (R. ¶ 14). Mr. Sero liked the new
facility because of the higher quality of care and because it was closer to his home,
making it easier to pick up and drop off the children. (R. ¶ 14).
The facility cost $400 per month more than the previous daycare facility.
(R. ¶ 14). As the parties had agreed, Ms. Felix paid the childcare center and sought
6
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reimbursement for a share of the expense from Mr. Sero. (R. ¶ 15). Ms. Felix provided
written verification to Mr. Sero of the increased rates and asked Mr. Sero to pay his share
but Mr. Sero never did. (R. ¶ 15). Mr. Sero testified that he was aware of the obligation
but that he did not think it applied. (R. ¶ 15). Mr. Sero believed that, because Ms. Felix
made the change without telling him first, he did not have to pay his share of the
childcare expenses when Ms. Felix asked for reimbursement. (R. ¶ 15). Mr. Sero never
paid his share of the childcare expenses, and the outstanding amount is now nearly
$24,000 accumulated over the ten years since the divorce. (R. ¶ 26). Ms. Felix did not
pursue the issue further after Mr. Sero did not pay his share of the expenses. (R. ¶ 15).
Mr. Sero argued in the district court that if Ms. Felix had brought up the issue, then Mr.
Sero could have challenged the obligation in court. (R. ¶ 26). Mr. Sero based this
argument on his view that he was not required to pay because Ms. Felix did not tell him
about the increased expenses before switching childcare facilities (R. ¶ 16).
Mr. Sero’s Time as Caregiver
Following the divorce, Mr. Sero had primary custody of the children. (R. ¶ 5). The
parties “very amicably and conscientiously handled Ms. Felix’s visitation of her
children,” and adhered to “mutually acceptable” parenting plans throughout Mr. Sero’s
time as caregiver. (R. ¶ 5). Mr. Sero, in his capacity as sole physical custodian of the
children, handled the greater share of the parenting responsibilities, and handled those
responsibilities well. (R. ¶ 6).
Mr. Sero consistently puts the needs of his children before his own. (R. ¶ 6). For
example, when Mr. Sero’s brother won an all-expenses-paid trip to Bavaria and asked
7
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Mr. Sero to join him, Mr. Sero arranged to have the children stay with his parents for the
duration of the trip. (R. ¶ 7) However, upon further thought, Mr. Sero declined once it
became clear that the trip was in conflict with his and Ms. Felix’s daughter’s ballet recital
and their son’s little league playoffs. (R. ¶ 7). On the second occasion, Mr. Sero’s
daughter was sick, and required several days of home care. (R. ¶ 8). Mr. Sero stayed
home from work to provide that care, even though his employment did not provide for
sick leave to cover the extended absence. (R. ¶ 8). The district court noted that such a
sacrifice is “central to sound parenting.” (R. ¶ 8).
Based on these examples and other accounts of Mr. Sero’s sound parenting, the
custody evaluator concluded that “Mr. Sero provided a ‘stable, supportive, and positive
growth environment for the children” and had balanced his career, childcare, and
maintaining a positive relationship with an ex-spouse very well. (R. ¶ 9).
Ms. Felix’s Justification for Moving the Children
Shortly after Ms. Felix published her graduate thesis, her investment in her
children’s future paid off (R. ¶ 10; ¶ 13). On the strength of Ms. Felix’s technological
breakthroughs in the field of chemical engineering, Ms. Felix was courted by several
pharmaceutical manufacturers. (R. ¶ 13). Ms. Felix was offered high-level positions at
any of the largest and most powerful pharmaceutical companies in the United States.
(R. ¶ 16).
Though all of the offers would require Ms. Felix to relocate to the east coast, the
offers would all provide significant financial freedom. (R. ¶ 16). Beyond financial
freedom, Ms. Felix also negotiated a unique “quality of life” package with a South
8
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Carolina company in order to “make up for lost time” with her children. (R. ¶ 17). The
package entitles her to six two-week vacations per year to spend with her children.
(R. ¶ 17). When she is not on leave, Ms. Felix will not be required to work more than 40
hours per week. (R. ¶ 17). This employment package also includes a “generous policy for
sick-leave (above and beyond the scheduled leave)” in case health problems arise again
for the children. (R. ¶ 17). The company also agreed to cover the costs of tuition and
extracurricular activities at any of several private schools identified by the company
(R. ¶ 17). Additionally, the company would provide free enrollment for the children to
two different study abroad opportunities in Europe during summers while they are in high
school. (R. ¶ 17).
The district court gave no meaningful weight to Ms. Felix’s compensation
structure because, even if Mr. Sero maintained sole custody, the new wealth that Ms.
Felix had worked to acquire would be redistributed to Mr. Sero under the terms of the
divorce decree. (R. ¶ 19). However, the court’s custody evaluator testified that the
proposed structure was “perhaps the best conceivable approach to childhood development
for teenagers.” (R. ¶ 19). The custody evaluator testified that: “Putting teens in good
schools positions them for future success. Participating in varied extra-curricular
activities not only contributes to their happiness and growth, but also sets them up to
succeed outside of a classroom. The study abroad experiences raise cultural awareness
and instill in teenagers a sense of their role in the world . . . .” (R. ¶ 19). The custody
evaluator also concluded that Ms. Felix’s frequent and extended vacations are “likely to
foster positive bonding” and that “there is no better recipe for a positive relationship.” To
9
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take advantage of these vast benefits, Ms. Felix and the children must move to South
Carolina. (R. ¶ 18).
The Court’s Attempts to Compromise with Mr. Sero
Mr. Sero is aware of the benefits his children stand to reap from the opportunities
Ms. Felix can now provide. (R. ¶ 19). Likewise, the court could not ignore the benefits
that the children would enjoy from Ms. Felix’s employment, and the court was persuaded
by the equity of giving Ms. Felix the opportunity to build the kind of relationship with the
children that Mr. Sero had built over the last ten years. (R. ¶ 20). Still, the court offered to
allow Mr. Sero to retain primary custody if Mr. Sero would move to South Carolina with
his children and Ms. Felix. (R. ¶ 21). Mr. Sero refused, maintaining that there “is just no
way I can leave my job, my family, my home, my friends, and the life I have built in
Utah.” (R. ¶ 21).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case stems from divorce proceedings between Ms. Felix and Mr. Sero in
2005. (R. ¶ 1). In the initial divorce decree, Mr. Sero was awarded sole physical custody
of their two children. (R. ¶ 1). Mr. Sero retained sole physical custody for ten years
following the divorce. (R. ¶ 4). In early 2015, Ms. Felix earned a Ph.D. in chemical
engineering and subsequently negotiated a lucrative and flexible employment package
with a company in South Carolina. (R. ¶ 16; ¶ 17). Ms. Felix now seeks to modify the
divorce decree. (R. ¶ 4). Ms. Felix brought this action in the district court and sought
modification of the divorce decree to allow her to move with her children to South

10
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Carolina to take advantage of the many benefits provided by her new professional
opportunity. (R. ¶ 22).
At trial, Ms. Felix argued a number of issues but sought two main remedies.
(R. ¶ 1). First, Ms. Felix sought sole custody of her children, in order to move with them
to South Carolina. (R. ¶ 2); and second, Ms. Felix brought a claim for Mr. Sero’s unpaid
share of childcare expenses (R. ¶ 15). The district court agreed with Ms. Felix that it was
in the best interests of the children to move with their mother to South Carolina.
(R. ¶ 20). The court offered Mr. Sero a compromise offer, wherein he would retain sole
physical custody if he would move to South Carolina with Ms. Felix and the children.
(R. ¶ 20). Mr. Sero declined, citing his constitutional right to travel in order to stay in
Utah. (R. ¶ 22). Additionally, Mr. Sero asserted laches to bar Ms. Felix’s recovery of the
unpaid childcare expenses, due to Ms. Felix’s ten-year delay in bringing the claim
(R. ¶ 26). On the issue of custody, the district court found that it would serve the
children’s best interests to pursue the opportunities in South Carolina and awarded sole
physical custody to Ms. Felix. (R. ¶ 25). On the issue of laches, the district court held that
the laches was available to bar Ms. Felix’s claim for unpaid childcare expenses. (R. ¶ 27).
Both parties appealed the district court’s decision. (R. ¶ 28). The court of appeals
reversed the district court’s award of sole custody to Ms. Felix on the grounds that the
district court did not give due consideration to Mr. Sero’s constitutional right to travel.
(R. ¶ 28). On the laches issue, the court of appeals “reluctantly affirm[ed]” based on
horizontal stare decisis supporting the use of laches to cut short the statute of limitations.
(R. ¶ 28).
11
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In this Court, the parties present the same two issues: First, whether a custody
determination must balance the parents’ competing constitutional rights to travel, rather
than being based solely on the best interests of the children, and second, whether the
defense of laches is available when the Legislature has acted to create a statute of
limitations. See Addendum A.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
For the reasons that follow, Petitioner is requesting that the Court rule on two
issues: (I) whether a custody determination must balance the parents’ competing rights to
interstate travel rather than being based solely on the best interests of the children, and
(II) whether a parent can assert laches to avoid paying outstanding childcare expenses
when the applicable statute of limitations has not yet barred the claim. Both of these
issues turn on the weight given to the best interests of children in divorce proceedings.
First, a parent’s right to travel should not outweigh the best interests of the
children. The Utah Legislature directs, “In determining any form of custody, including a
change in custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child . . . .” UTAH
CODE § 30-3-10(a). The best-interests approach, which “has long been the bellwether
indicator of custody determinations,” Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 55 (Zane, J.
dissenting part and concurring in part), is constitutionally sound and produces desirable
results.
Parents enjoy a fundamental right to interstate travel, as established by the United
States Constitution. Because the right to travel is fundamental, any infringement on that
right is subject to strict scrutiny. Thus, when a custody determination infringes a parent’s
12

2470

fundamental right to interstate travel, it will only survive strict scrutiny if it is narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.
States have a “duty of the highest order to protect the interests of minor children.”
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). When a custody determination is narrowly
tailored to “protect the interests of [the] children,” it is constitutionally sound despite any
infringement on the parents’ respective rights to interstate travel. Id.
In addition to following from precedent, the best-interests approach also produces
desirable results. A custody determination that is grounded on the best interests of the
children avoids harm to parents because it does not attempt to determine whether one
parent’s fundamental right to interstate travel is weightier than another parent’s
fundamental right to interstate travel. Moreover, the best-interests approach avoids harm
to children because it does not yield an outcome that differs from a court’s objective
determination of the custody arrangement that would best serve the interests of the
children.
Turning to the claims for unpaid childcare expenses, Mr. Sero should not be
permitted to use the doctrine of laches to cut short the statute of limitations for two main
reasons: First, the court’s bar on defenses of waiver and estoppel should be read to
include a bar on laches; and second, allowing laches to cut short the statute of limitations
violates separation of powers principles.
First, when the Legislature barred claims for waiver and estoppel in certain actions
for unpaid child support, the use of the terms “waiver and estoppel” created ambiguity. It
is well understood that the doctrine of laches “may operate as an estoppel against the
13
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assertion of a right.” 31 Williston on Contracts § 79:11 (4th ed.). Given the close link in
Utah case law between doctrines of laches, waiver, and estoppel, and the functional
similarity of the two doctrines, it is unclear whether the court meant to bar claims for
estoppel specifically, or all claims that operate as an estoppel. The court may resolve this
ambiguity by looking to the absurd consequences canon, which encourages courts to
adopt a reading that does not render a term of the statute a nullity. Reading the
Legislature’s bar on waiver and estoppel to allow laches creates a way to sidestep the bar
on estoppel by asserting laches instead. In practice, this result nullifies the bar on
estoppel. Therefore, the court should read the bar on estoppel to include a bar on laches.
Second, allowing laches to cut short the statute of limitations violates separation of
powers principles. Utah courts have refused to give up their equitable powers absent a
clear command from the Legislature. By barring defenses of waiver and estoppel, the
Legislature issued a clear command to the courts to give up their equitable powers.
While Utah courts have abandoned the distinction between law and equity, when
the Legislature has acted, a court still may only exercise their equitable powers when it is
necessary to prevent injustice. Allowing laches is not necessary to prevent injustice here.
.Mr. Sero owes Ms. Felix $24,000 in unpaid childcare expenses; those expenses are his
responsibility and the funds would have been used for the benefit of the children. Using
laches to punish Ms. Felix and vindicate Mr. Sero results primarily in reduced financial
resources for children.
Moreover, the Legislature is in the best position to make broad determinations of
the amount of time parents have to bring claims for unpaid child support. Allowing
14

2470

laches to cut short the statute of limitations creates an imperative for ex-spouses to enter
quick litigation, rather than trying to settle the problems themselves or waiting until after
their children reach majority to sue one another. Forcing ex-spouses to litigate quickly or
lose their claims ultimately results in familial strain injustice to the children.
ARGUMENT
I. A CUSTODY DETERMINATION IS PROPERLY BASED ON THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILDREN BECAUSE THE BEST-INTERESTS APPROACH IS
HARMONIOUS WITH COMPETING CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS AND
AVOIDS HARM TO PARENTS AND CHILDREN.
A custody determination should be based on the best interests of the children in
accordance with section 30-3-10 of the Utah Code, which provides: “In determining any
form of custody, including a change in custody, the court shall consider the best interests
of the child . . . .” UTAH CODE § 30-3-10(a). This approach is harmonious with
competing constitutional concerns and avoids harm to both parents and children.
The United States Constitution protects a fundamental right to travel. Saenz v.
Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999). This Court has recognized that a right is fundamental
when it “form[s] an implicit part of the life of a free citizen in a free society . . . .” Utah
Public Emp. Ass’n v. State, 610 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Utah 1980). The right to interstate
travel is one such fundamental right. Id. When this Court “has recognized a . . . right it
deems ‘fundamental,’ it has consistently applied a standard of strict scrutiny to the
protection of such a right.” Jones v. Jones, 2015 UT 84, ¶ 26, 359 P.3d 603.
Under strict scrutiny, a state may not “infring[e] fundamental liberty interests,
unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”
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Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003). To be sure, the “State has an urgent
interest in the welfare of the child . . . .” Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of Durham
County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981). Thus, a custody determination that infringes the
parents’ competing rights to interstate travel will survive when the determination is
narrowly tailored to achieve the best interests of the children.
The best-interests approach is not only constitutionally sound, it also produces
desirable outcomes because it avoids harm to parents and children. The best-interests
approach avoids a determination that one parent’s fundamental right to interstate travel is
weightier than another parent’s fundamental right to interstate travel and it avoids an
outcome that undermines the best interests of the children.
This Court should hold that a custody determination is properly based on the best
interests of the children because (A) the best-interests approach is harmonious with
competing constitutional concerns that arise from the parents’ respective rights to
interstate travel and (B) the best-interests approach avoids harm to both parents and
children.
A.

The Best-Interests Approach is Harmonious with Competing
Constitutional Concerns Because Parents Enjoy a Fundamental Right
to Travel that Warrants Strict Scrutiny and States Have a Compelling
Interest in Protecting the Welfare of Children.

A custody determination is harmonious with the competing constitutional
concerns of the parents when it is narrowly tailored to achieve the best interests of the
children. Implicit in such a custody determination is a recognition that (1) parents enjoy a
fundamental right to interstate travel, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999), and (2) a

16

2470

custody determination may only infringe those rights if it is narrowly tailored to achieve
the best interests of the children, Jones v. Jones, 2015 UT 84, ¶ 27, 359 P.3d 603.
1.

Parents enjoy a fundamental right to interstate travel and any infringement
on that right warrants strict scrutiny.

Parents enjoy a fundamental right to interstate travel, as established by the United
States Constitution, and that right may only be infringed by a custody determination if the
determination survives strict scrutiny.
The court of appeals correctly found that the United States Constitution protects a
fundamental right to travel that includes the right to choose one’s state of residence. Felix
v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 31,---P.3d---. The court recognized that the right is both
“firmly embedded in [constitutional] jurisprudence,” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498
(1999), and “notoriously difficult to pin down.” Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 31.
The court traced the right’s possible origins from the privileges and immunities clause,
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501–02, the due process clause, Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418–19
n.13 (1981), or the commerce clause, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758–59
(1966). Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 31. Regardless of its origins, “[a]ll have
agreed that the right exists.” Guest, 383 U.S. at 759.
In the context of custody determinations, a parent’s right to interstate travel is
intertwined with a fundamental right to the “companionship, care, custody, and
management of his or her children.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). Indeed,
the Supreme Court has proclaimed that the rights to conceive and raise one’s children are
“essential,” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), and “basic civil rights,”
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Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). In every custody determination, the
parental rights at stake are numerous and weighty.
The deprivation of such rights in a custody determination is subject to strict
scrutiny. LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 163 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). Under this
exacting standard, “a fundamental right is protected except in the limited circumstance in
which an infringement of it is shown to be ‘narrowly tailored’ to protect a ‘compelling
governmental interest.’” Jones v. Jones, 2015 UT 84, ¶ 27, 359 P.3d 603 (citing
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). This is, in effect, the standard that
Utah courts have historically applied in custody determinations. See Felix v. Sero, 2017
UT App 723, ¶ 54 (Zane, J. dissenting part and concurring in part) (“I believe that rule is,
in effect, the rule applied by the district court in this case . . . .”).
The Utah Supreme Court has already contemplated the possibility of a new,
intermediate standard in the context of child custody and visitation rights. Jones v. Jones,
2015 UT 84, ¶ 29, 359 P.3d 603. But the court noted that “the enterprise . . . of
abandoning the usual standard for a lesser one that balances the relevant interests in a
new way—is an uncomfortable venture for a lower court. Such a venture seems more an
act of policymaking than of application of controlling law.” Id. Thus, until the Supreme
Court of the United States prescribes a different standard, any infringement on a parent’s
right to interstate travel in a custody determination is subject to strict scrutiny and may
only survive if narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Jones v. Jones,
2015 UT 84, ¶ 27, 359 P.3d 603.
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2.

States have a compelling interest in protecting the welfare of children, and a
custody determination will survive strict scrutiny when it is narrowly
tailored to achieve the best interests of the children.

States have a compelling interest in protecting the best interests of children,
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984), and a custody determination will survive
when it is narrowly tailored to achieve the best interests of the children. Jones v. Jones,
2015 UT 84, ¶ 27, 359 P.3d 603.
In a custody determination, the “paramount consideration is the best interest of the
child.” Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982); UTAH CODE § 30-3-10(a)
(“In determining any form of custody . . . the court shall consider the best interests of the
child.”). Indeed, the best-interests approach “has long been the bellwether indicator of
custody determinations . . . .” Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 55 (Zane, J. dissenting
part and concurring in part). The best-interests approach, rooted in the wisdom of Utah
courts and the Utah Legislature, represents a compelling state interest.
The Supreme Court of the United States has proclaimed that “[t]he State, of
course, has a duty of the highest order to protect the interests of minor children.” Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). This Court has recognized that the objective of
preserving the best interests of children is “among the most important of any in our
society.” In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶ 74, 358 P.3d 1009. Thus, the state has a
compelling interest in protecting the best interests of the children in custody
determinations. “Were that not the case, every custody determination would be
constitutionally infirm because every custody determination would limit parental rights
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on some lesser showing [than a compelling interest].” Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723,
¶ 54 (Zane, J. dissenting part and concurring in part).
In determining which situation will serve the best interests of the children, a trial
court may consider “numerous factors, each of which may vary in importance according
to the facts in the particular case.” Sanderson v. Tyson, 739 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1987).
Those factors may include “the parenting skills, character, and abilities of both parents in
light of a realistic and objective appraisal of the needs of a child.” Elmer v. Elmer, 776
P.2d 599, 603 (Utah 1989). For example, in the present case, the district court was
persuaded by the custody evaluator’s testimony that, “[w]here it’s possible to structure
parent-child interactions in the way Ms. Felix contemplates, our studies show there is no
better recipe for a positive relationship.” Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 19
(majority).
Given the breadth of factors that a trial court may consider, it is difficult to
imagine a custody dispute where the best interests of the children are equally served by
awarding custody to either parent. Still, the court of appeals expressed serious concern
about this slight possibility. Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 39 (majority) (“[I]f a
court concludes that the best interests of the children are going to be served equally well
by either custody determination, then [the best-interests] approach would give as much
weight to a coin toss as it would to the parents’ rights.”). However, in such a rare
circumstance, applying strict scrutiny provides an adequate solution.
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A custody determination that infringes a parent’s right to interstate travel will only
survive if it is both justified by a compelling interest and narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest. If the best interests of the children will be equally served by either parent, a court
may determine that a custody arrangement is narrowly tailored when it does the least
harm to the parents’ competing rights to interstate travel. Ultimately, however, trial
courts are well-equipped to make difficult decisions based on the facts of each case. Any
potential for difficult decision-making should not dissuade this Court from holding that
the infringement of a parent’s right to interstate travel warrants strict scrutiny, and that a
custody determination will survive strict scrutiny when it is narrowly tailored to achieve
the best interests of the children.
Because parents enjoy a fundamental right to interstate travel, any infringement on
that right must be subject to strict scrutiny. Accordingly, a custody determination may
only survive when it is narrowly tailored to achieve the best interests of the children. This
approach is dictated by the United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, and
the Utah legislature. What’s more, the best-interests approach produced desirable results
because it avoids harm to both parents and children.
B.

The Best-Interests Approach Avoids Harm to Parents and Children
Because It Does Not Attempt to Value One Parent’s Rights Over
Another Parent’s Rights and Does Not Yield an Outcome that
Undermines the Children’s Best Interests.

A custody determination that is based on the best interests of the children avoids
harm to parents and children. It does not require courts to determine whether one parent’s
constitutional right to interstate travel supersedes another parent’s constitutional right to
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interstate travel. Moreover, it does not yield an outcome that undermines the bestinterests of the children.
1.

The best-interests approach avoids a determination that one parent’s right to
interstate travel is weightier than another parent’s right to interstate travel.

If this Court embarks on an “enterprise . . . of abandoning the usual standard for a
lesser one that balances the relevant interests in a new way,” Jones v. Jones, 2015 UT 84,
¶ 29, 359 P.3d 603, district courts will be obliged to determine whether one parent’s
rights are weightier than another parent’s rights. Specifically, the standard recommended
by the Utah Court of Appeals would require district courts to balance each parent’s right
to interstate travel, against the right of each parent to “to maintain close association and
frequent contact with the child,” against the best interests of the children. Felix v. Sero,
2017 UT App 723, ¶ 40 (quoting In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 146
(Colo. 2005).
To be sure, courts frequently balance the rights and interests of relevant parties.
Matter of Adoption of Baby Q, 2016 UT 29, ¶ 11, 379 P.3d 1231 (balancing the interests
of parties to an adoption). In the adoption context, the Utah Legislature has made clear
that the best interests of the child should govern the determination, and that “the rights
and interests of all parties affected by an adoption proceeding must be considered and
balanced in determining what constitutional protections and processes are necessary and
appropriate.” UTAH CODE § 78B-6-102(1), (3). The Legislature notes the varied rights
and interests of the biological parents, the adoptive parents, and the state. Id. at § 78B-6102(5). In accounting for these rights and interests, the Legislature specifies that courts
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should determine what “constitutional protections and processes are necessary . . ..” Id. at
§ 78B-6-102(3).
In custody determinations following divorce, the best-interests approach provides
the necessary constitutional protection: strict scrutiny. To move further would be to work
an injustice. Beyond subjecting the infringement of each parents’ right to interstate travel
to strict scrutiny, it is difficult to see how a court could determine that one parent’s right
is weightier than the other. Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 55 (Zane, J. dissenting part
and concurring in part). For example, while Mr. Sero enjoys a right to maintain a
residence in Utah, Ms. Felix enjoys a right to seek opportunity in South Carolina. Both
rights are fundamental and are protected equally by the Constitution of the United States.
“Perhaps the [court of appeals] means that, on balance, one parent is less likely to be
harmed by losing that right, but that seems to me to be poor justification for a
constitutional infringement.” Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 55 (Zane, J. dissenting
part and concurring in part). Any determination that one parent’s right to travel is
weightier than the other parent’s right to travel would be constitutionally infirm because
the state would not have a compelling justification for infringing one parent’s right to
travel if the custody determination is not based on the best interests of the children.
Holding that a custody determination should be governed by the best interests of
the children will avoid the injustice of finding that one parent’s fundamental right to
interstate travel is weightier than the other parent’s fundamental right to interstate travel.
Instead, it provides the necessary constitutional protections by subjecting any
infringement of the parents’ respective rights to strict scrutiny. This approach not only
23

2470

serves the interests of each parent, it avoids an outcome that is contrary to the children’s
best interests.
2.

The best-interests approach avoids an outcome that undermines the best
interests of the children.

A custody determination should be governed by the best interests of the children,
in harmony with Utah Code section 30-3-10(a) and in accord with a long line of custody
determinations wherein the “paramount consideration is the best interest of the child.”
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982). Such a determination is “based on
an objective and impartial comparison of the parenting skills, character, and abilities of
both parents in light of a realistic and objective appraisal of the needs of a child.” Elmer
v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 603 (Utah 1989). If this Court turns away from the best-interests
approach and adopts a test that “balances the relevant interests in a new way,” Jones v.
Jones, 2015 UT 84, ¶ 29, 359 P.3d 603, district courts would be compelled to turn their
focus away from the best interests of the children.
Any outcome that turns on the parents’ right to interstate travel would necessarily
undermine the best interests of the children and run contrary to the Legislature’s directive
in Utah Code section 30-3-10. It is possible that after weighing each parent’s right to
interstate travel, a court may well make a custody determination that is consistent with its
“objective and impartial” determination of the children’s best interests. Elmer, 776 P.2d
at 603; Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 42 (noting that, on remand, the district court
may still award primary custody to Ms. Felix after balancing Mr. Sero’s right to travel
against Ms. Felix’s right to travel).
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However, if the predicted outcome ever changes after an evaluation of each
parent’s right to interstate travel, then the court has necessarily acted contrary to the
children’s best interests. Following a court’s “objective and impartial” assessment of the
children’s best interests, any custody determination to the contrary, made in light of a
parent’s right to travel, does harm to the children. Any such determination runs contrary
to the legislative directive set forth in Utah Code section 30-3-10 and violates the state’s
“duty of the highest order to protect the interests of minor children . . . .” Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
Thus, the best-interests approach avoids harm to children because it ensures
outcomes that are consistent with a court’s “objective and impartial” determination of the
custody arrangement that will protect the children’s best interests. Because the bestinterests approach is harmonious with competing constitutional concerns and because it
avoids harm to parents and children, this Court should hold that a custody determination
is properly based on the best interests of the children.
II. LACHES MAY NOT BE USED TO CUT SHORT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
BECAUSE SUCH A READING RENDERS A TERM OF THE STATUTE A NULLITY
AND VIOLATES SEPARATION OF POWERS.
The Utah Legislature enacted a statute of limitations for bringing a claim for
unpaid child support expenses that runs “within four years after the date the youngest
child reaches majority” or “eight years from the date of entry of the sum certain judgment
. . . .” UTAH CODE § 78B-5-202 (6)(a)(i)–(ii). The Legislature also acted to foreclose
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defenses of waiver and estoppel in most claims for unpaid child support.1 UTAH CODE
§ 78B-12-109 (1)–(2). In Veysey v. Veysey, 2014 UT App 264, ¶ 18, 339 P.3d 131
(“Veysey I”), the Utah Court of Appeals refused to read the Legislature’s bar on waiver
and estoppel claims to also act as a bar on the related defense of laches. Id. In doing so,
the court held that a party could assert laches to cut short the legislatively defined statute
of limitations, regardless of the Legislature’s bar on claims for estoppel. Id. ¶ 18 n.6. The
Court of Appeals affirmed this decision in Veysey v. Nelson, 2017 UT App 77, ¶ 14, 397
P.3d 846 (“Veysey II”).
This case is factually similar to Veysey I and Veysey II. Here, Ms. Felix makes
several claims for unpaid childcare expenses that were not foreclosed by the statute of
limitations (R. ¶ 15). Though the statute of limitations had not yet barred the claims, the
district court and the court of appeals both found that Ms. Felix’s claims were foreclosed
by Mr. Sero’s laches defense. (R. ¶ 43). Both courts were “bound by precedent” from
Veysey I and Veysey II in reaching this decision. (R. ¶ 43).
We ask this Court to reconsider the holding that a party may use laches to cut short
the applicable statute of limitations for two reasons: (A) the close link between estoppel
and laches creates ambiguity, and reading the statute to allow laches but not estoppel
renders the bar on estoppel a nullity, and (B) allowing parties to use laches to cut short

In this section of the statute, the Legislature only allows defenses of waiver and
estoppel “when there is no order already established by a tribunal if the custodial
parent freely and voluntarily waives support specifically and in writing.” UTAH
CODE 78B-12-109 (1). Additionally, the court in Veysey I held that “variable
daycare expenses constitute child support.” Id. ¶ 15.
1
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the statute of limitations violates separation of powers by overlooking a clear command
from the Legislature and primarily resulting in limitation of financial resources for
children.
A.

Reading the Statute to Foreclose Waiver and Estoppel But Allow
Laches Renders the Legislature’s Bar on Estoppel a Nullity.

When interpreting a statute, the court’s primary goal is to “give effect to the
legislature’s intent in light of the purpose that the statute was meant to achieve.” Garfield
County v. United States, 2017 UT 41, ¶ 15,--- P.3d ---; State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80,
¶ 8, 52 P.3d 1276. In order to understand and give effect to the Legislature’s purpose,
courts often examine (1) whether, after a plain language analysis, a statute’s terms remain
ambiguous, or “susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations” State v. Rasabout,
2015 UT 72, ¶ 22, 356 P.3d 1258; Garfield, 2017 UT 41, ¶ 15, and (2), where statutory
language is ambiguous, whether utilizing established canons of statutory interpretation
may eliminate ambiguity. Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch Partnership, 2011 UT 50,
¶ 15, 267 P.3d 863; Utley v. Mill Man Steel, Inc., 2015 UT 75, ¶ 46, 357 P.3d 992.
1.

The Legislature’s use of “waiver and estoppel” is ambiguous as to whether
it also prohibits the similar defense of laches.

In general, where a statute’s plain language is “unambiguous and provides a
workable result,” the court may end its analysis there. Garfield, 2017 UT 41, ¶ 15.
However, if after a plain language analysis, a term of the statute remains ambiguous, or
“susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations,” the court may look to established
canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 22.
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The doctrines of laches, waiver, and estoppel have been closely linked in Utah
case law for years. This close link creates ambiguity. Many Utah cases refer to the
doctrines of laches, waiver, and estoppel as a single unit. See e.g., State Bank of Southern
Utah v. Troy Hygro Systems, Inc., 894 P.2d 1270, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (referring
to a bank’s claims as being “barred by laches, waiver and estoppel.”); K.O. v. Denison,
748 P.2d 588, 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (providing that a party is barred from asserting a
claim by “laches, waiver, and estoppel”); 20C AmJur Pl. & Pr. Forms Quieting title § 67
(referring to the doctrine as “estoppel by laches”); 6 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 31:2 (5th ed.) (referring to the doctrine as “estoppel by laches”). The
doctrines of laches, waiver and estoppel are so closely related that, in 31 Williston on
Contracts § 79:11 (4th ed.), Samuel Williston described laches as “operat[ing] as an
estoppel against the assertion of a right.” Id. This quotation, in particular, suggests that
laches is a subset of the broader doctrine of estoppel.2
Though laches and estoppel require parties to show different elements, the two
doctrines are similar in the type of harm they redress and in the specific remedy they
provide. Estoppel is defined as “a[n] act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a
claim later asserted; reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on

One reason that laches was often treated as a subset of estoppel in Utah case
law and national treaties is because they were generally brought as a tandem
defense. See e.g. Burmingham v. Burke, 245 P. 977, 979–80 (Utah 1926) (providing
an example of the defenses of estoppel and laches being asserted together).
Indeed, in most cases where laches could be successfully asserted as a defense,
estoppel would also apply. Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974)
(discussing the defense of estoppel to a claim for unpaid child support).
2
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the basis of the first party's . . . act, or failure to act; and injury to the second party that
would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such . . . act, or
failure to act.” CEOC Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969–70 (Utah
1989); while laches requires a party to show “[t]he lack of diligence on the part of
plaintiff; [and a]n injury to defendant owing to such lack of diligence.” Papanikolas
Bros. Enter. v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assoc., 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975).
The difference in these two doctrines is slight. Estoppel is broader than laches, and
can apply to actions as well as inactions, and estoppel does not require an unreasonable
delay in time. Laches operates in a similar fashion, but only applies to the inaction of one
party which injures another party. Moreover, the classic understanding is that laches is a
defense which prevents parties from unreasonably delaying to bring a claim. Borland ex
rel. Utah State Dep’t of Soc. Serv. v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987). In most
cases, parties can achieve the same remedy for the same harm using either laches or
estoppel. Therefore, the slight differences between laches and estoppel do not serve to
divide the doctrines, but rather to show that laches falls under the broad umbrella of
estoppel.
Based on the close link between the doctrines of estoppel and laches, and the
overlapping nature of the claims, the use of “waiver and estoppel” in the statute is
ambiguous and requires additional interpretation beyond a plain language reading.
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2.

The absurd consequences canon inclines away from a reading that
nullifies a term of the statute.

After identifying ambiguity in a statute, the next step is to look to accepted canons
of construction. “When statutory language is ambiguous—in that its terms remain
susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations after we have conducted a plain
language analysis—we generally resort to other modes of statutory construction” Marion
Energy, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14; Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 22. One such mode of statutory
construction is the absurd consequences canon. This canon provides that courts should
preserve legislative intent and resolve ambiguity by reading a statute in a way that does
not “render[] a provision a nullity.” Utley, 2015 UT 75, ¶ 23.
Before moving forward, it is important to distinguish the absurd consequences
canon from the absurdity doctrine. Both interpretive tools deal in absurd results, however
the absurd consequences canon is a gentle tool, which steers ambiguous statutory
language toward a reading that does not render any term of the statute null. Utley, 2015
UT 75, ¶ 46. (Durrant, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In contrast, the
absurdity doctrine has been characterized as “strong medicine, not to be administered
lightly” Garfield, 2017 UT 41, ¶ 44 (Voros, J., dissenting). The absurdity doctrine “has
nothing to do with resolving ambiguities. Rather, we apply this [doctrine] to reform
unambiguous statutory language where applying the plain language leads to results so
overwhelmingly absurd no rational legislator could have intended them.” Utley, 2015 UT
75, ¶ 46. In this case, we do not suggest that the Legislature’s bar on waiver and estoppel
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but not laches is “overwhelmingly absurd,” but rather that it is ambiguous. Id. To resolve
this ambiguity, we use the absurd consequences canon.
The policy behind the absurd consequences canon is to create a preference for
interpretations of statutes that do not “invite[] confusion [or create] piecemeal litigation, a
waste of judicial resources, [or] gamesmanship in the payment of claims.” Encon Utah,
LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, ¶ 73, 210 P.3d 263 (emphasis added). In
Encon, the Utah Supreme Court used the absurd consequences canon in the judgment of a
contractor’s claim for unpaid work from a subcontractor. The court rejected an
interpretation of the statute that would attach a separate statute of limitations to each
individual piece of work a subcontractor completed for a contractor. Id. ¶ 74. The court
noted that this “create[s] an unworkable standard” by creating a series of unpredictable
timelines for bringing claims and encouraging gamesmanship in the payment of claims.”
Id. Therefore, the court adopted an interpretation of the statute that would avoid this
confusion. Id.
The absurd consequences canon can help us avoid a similarly confusing result
here. Given the facts in this case and the court of appeals’ reading of the statute, Mr. Sero
would be prohibited from asserting estoppel, however Mr. Sero achieved effectively the
same result by claiming laches. The practical result in reading the statute to bar estoppel
but not laches is the same as if the Legislature did not bar estoppel at all. As in Utley, the
Veysey II court’s interpretation of the statute as not barring laches in addition to estoppel
renders the Legislature’s bar on estoppel a nullity. Utley, 2015 UT 75, ¶ 23. Furthermore,
allowing laches encourages “gamesmanship in the payment of claims,” by encouraging
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parties to strategically assert laches to avoid payment of unpaid childcare expenses. To
avoid rendering the bar on estoppel a nullity, this Court should read the bar on estoppel to
include laches.
B.

Allowing Laches to Cut Short the Statute of Limitations Violates
Separation of Powers by Overlooking a Clear Command From the
Legislature and Creating Injustice For the Children.

Utah’s Constitution provides for separation of powers in Article V, Section 1.
“The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any
functions appertaining to either of the others . . . .” UTAH CONST. art. V, § 1. Regarding
the roles of the distinct branches of Utah’s government, the Utah Supreme Court
provides, “It is the judiciary's role to interpret statutes and to ensure their constitutionality
. . . It is not the judiciary's role to augment existing statutes to satisfy private parties . . .
nor to enforce statutes where no judicial remedy for private parties is anticipated or
provided for in the statute.” Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan, 2017 UT 45, ¶ 39,
---P.3d--- (citations omitted).
Here, the application of laches to cut short the statute of limitations for bringing
child support claims violates separation of powers for two reasons: (1) by creating a
statute of limitations and barring claims for waiver and estoppel, the Legislature issued a
“clear command” to the court to give up its equitable powers, and (2) the Legislature is in
the best position to decide the amount of time a parent has to bring a claim for unpaid
child support to avoid familial strain and injustice for children.
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1.

By creating a statute of limitations and barring claims for waiver and
estoppel, the Legislature issued a “clear command” to the court to give up
its equitable powers.

The court in Veysey II refused to “construe a statute to displace courts’ traditional
equitable authority absent the ‘clearest command’ or an ‘inescapable inference’ to the
contrary.” Veysey II, ¶ 7 n.4 (citing Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 340 (2000)).
However, the court in Miller used that standard to hold that the statutory mandate of an
“automatic stay” to enjoin relief from substandard prison conditions, upon a motion to
modify or terminate the relief, did in fact provide a clear command from Congress to
displace the court’s traditional equitable powers to grant injunctions. Miller, 530 U.S. at
340–41 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (e)(2)). Note that the Miller court did not require the
Legislature to specifically include a provision barring the court from using its injunctive
powers. Id. at 341. The court found that, by mandating an automatic stay rather than
allowing courts to hear motions for injunctions, the Legislature issued a clear command
for the court to give up injunctive powers.
In this case, we have a similar statutory instruction. Utah Code § 78B-12-109
provides that “waiver and estoppel” shall not apply to most claims for child support. This
provision is analogous to the provision in Miller that limits a court’s traditional equitable
powers. Miller, 530 U.S. at 333. Both provisions restrict courts’ ability to use certain
traditional equitable powers: injunctions for Miller, and estoppel in our case. The Miller
court found that the Legislature’s express instructions on how to handle injunctions in
cases falling under the statute was a sufficient command to the court to displace its
traditional equitable powers. Id. at 341. Likewise, this Court should hold that the
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Legislature’s express prohibition on defenses of estoppel constitutes a clear command for
the court to give up the equitable power of estoppel, as well as any equitable powers
which may be used to achieve the same substantive result. See infra (A)(i).
Moreover, in light of the canon of constitutional avoidance, reading the statute to
include laches in the definition of estoppel is a practical choice. The canon of
constitutional avoidance allows the court to “[reject] one of two plausible constructions
of a statute on the ground that it would raise grave doubts as to its constitutionality.”
Nevares v. M.L.S., 2015 UT 34, ¶ 38, 345 P.3d 719. Reading the statute, as Mr. Sero
urges, to allow a party to assert laches to cut short the statute of limitations raises
separation of powers questions. Laches is meant to be used as a gap-filler in order to
effectuate Legislative intent. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1962,
1973 (2014). When laches is used to alter statutory timelines, it creates grave concerns as
to whether the court is taking on a Legislative function. The canon of constitutional
avoidance provides an additional ground for reading the bar on estoppel as a bar on
laches as well—to avoid the constitutional problem that comes with the use of an
equitable doctrine to effectively rewrite a statutory mandate.
Therefore, the Legislature’s bar on defenses of estoppel constitutes a clear
command from congress to relinquish the court’s equitable powers. This Court should
read the statute to also bar laches to avoid overlooking a clear command from congress
and ultimately creating a constitutionally questionable reading.
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2.

The Legislature should decide the amount of time a parent has to bring a
claim for unpaid child support to avoid familial strain and injustice for
children.

The Utah Supreme Court in Carter v. Lehi City, 2012 UT 2, ¶ 33, 269 P.3d 141
provides, “Our understanding of the legislative power is informed by its placement in
relation to—and separation from—the executive and judicial power.” Id. In Alpine
Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan, 2017 UT 45, ---P.3d--- , the court noted that “it is the
judiciary’s role to interpret statutes and to ensure their constitutionality. It is not the
judiciary’s role to augment existing statutes to satisfy private parties . . . where no judicial
remedy for private parties is anticipated or provided for by the statute.” Id. ¶ 39.
The line between Legislative and Judicial power is not a bright one. Utah, like
most other jurisdictions, has abolished the distinction between law and equity. Borland,
733 P.2d at 146. However, the blending of law and equity does not create a presumption
that allowing principles of equity to alter statutes will always be proper. Borland goes on
to note that “[i]t is well established that equitable defenses may be applied in actions at
law and that principles of equity apply wherever necessary to prevent injustice.” Id.
(emphasis added). Therefore, the rule allowing equitable principles to apply at law is a
permissive one, and one that allows the Judiciary to reach into the Legislative realm only
when necessary to prevent injustice.
Additionally, the court in Insight Assets, Inc. v. Farias, 2013 UT 47, ¶ 20, 321
P.3d 1021 held that “the doctrine of laches may apply in equity, whether or not a statute
of limitation also applies and whether or not an applicable statute of limitation has been
satisfied.” Id. ¶ 18. However, Insight Assets authorized a court to allow laches to prevent
35

2470

injustice based on weighing the equities for two parties in a business transaction, where
the equities may be reduced to dollar-amount damages.
In this case, the determination of equities and injustice is more complicated.
Injustice is a matter of perspective. The equities in divorce cases are dissimilar to the
equities in Insight Assets, in that courts in divorce actions must consider what is fair and
equitable for the children above what seems unfair to a parent. The Utah Legislature
addressed this issue in statute: “In determining any form of custody, including a change
in custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child . . . .” UTAH CODE § 303-10(a) Moreover, Utah courts have long held that “the determining factor [in divorce
where children are involved] is the best interests and welfare of the child.” Walton v.
Coffman, 169 P.2d 97, 100 (Utah 1946); Kielkowski v. Kielkowski, 2015 UT App 59,
¶ 21, 346 P.3d 690. Mr. Sero argued below that the injustice in this case, which justified
the defense of laches, was that “Ms. Felix’s lack of diligence . . . by waiting nearly ten
years to do anything about the unpaid amounts . . . had allowed the outstanding amount
attributable to Mr. Sero to rise to nearly $24,000.” (R. ¶ 26). While this is certainly a
hardship for Mr. Sero, it does not rise to the level of injustice that would allow the court
to override the statute of limitations. Here, allowing Mr. Sero to assert laches to cut short
the statute of limitations is not necessary to prevent injustice, and actually creates
injustice from the perspective of his children for three reasons.
First, allowing laches to cut short the statute of limitations creates a mandate that
parents must sue each other as quickly as possible to avoid having laches asserted against
them, barring their recovery. This policy forces parents to litigate rather than giving them
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time to settle overdue child support claims outside of court. The statute of limitations
considers the problems that come with forcing parents of young children to sue each
other or risk losing their claim, by allowing parents to wait until their children reach
majority to bring claims for unpaid child support. UTAH CODE § 78B-5-202. Forcing
divorced couples to litigate or lose their claim in an uncertain amount of time due to
laches ultimately results in injustice to the children of divorce, who then have to watch
their parents sue each other over which parent has to pay for the child.
Second, the timelines for bringing claims for payment of child support is a matter
of public policy and should be decided by the Legislature. In the context of real estate
development, the court in Alpine Homes held that where “the right to a refund of unspent
impact fees, or [the existence of] an enforcement provision, or if they do not like the
ways that impact fees are calculated or may be expended, they can seek legislative
modification of the statute.” Id. ¶ 40. These matters are analogous to provisions for child
support actions. If parties believe that the timelines for bringing child support claims are
unfair, it is the role of the Legislature to modify the statute of limitations, not the role of
the court to cut short the statute of limitations in individual cases.
Third, it is well-established that the purpose of laches is to punish “those who
slumber on their rights.” Insight Assets, 2013 UT 47, ¶ 17. However, when laches is used
to prevent a claim for overdue child support, the punishment primarily affects the
children. Children have a right to child support from both parents, and, until they reach
majority, are not capable of “sleeping” on these rights as Insight Assets suggests.

37

2470

Allowing a parent to avoid paying child support for their child is not an appropriate
remedy for one parent’s delay.
For these reasons, allowing laches to cut short the statute of limitations creates
injustice for the children in these divorce actions. Injustice, which ultimately leads to a
strained home life, and a limitation of financial resources for children of divorce. In light
of the clear legislative act here, allowing laches to alter the statute of limitations violates
separation of powers by creating serious injustice for the most important parties: Mr.
Sero’s and Ms. Felix’s children.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the court of appeals decision
that a custody determination must balance the parents’ competing rights to interstate
travel. Instead, this Court should hold that a custody determination should turn on the
best interests of the children. Additionally, this Court should overturn court of appeals
precedent in Veysey I and Veysey II by holding that the defense of laches is not available
to cut short an applicable statute of limitations. These holdings will serve the best
interests of children in divorce cases, both on a broad public policy level, and in the
specific factual circumstances of this case.
SUBMITTED this 23rd day of February, 2018.
/s/ Team #2470
Team #2470
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
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Addendum A

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
---ooOoo--Nancy Felix,
Petitioner /
Appellant
v.
Jonathan Sero,
Respondent /
Appellee.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 20178791-SC

---ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed
on May 31, 2017.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is granted as to the
following issues.
1. Whether a custody determination must take into account a parents’
right to interstate travel, as established by the United States Constitution.
2. Whether the existence of an applicable statute of limitations forecloses
a party from asserting laches as a defense, where the period for establishing
laches is shorter than the applicable statute of limitations.
For the Court
Dated:

June 10, 2017
John G. Roberts
Chief Justice
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Addendum B

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
---ooOoo--Nancy Felix,
)
OPINION
)
Petitioner /
Case No. 20152311-CA
)
Appellant & Cross-Appellee,
)
FILED
v.
)
)
(May 22, 2017)
Jonathan Sero,
)
)
2017 UT App 723
Respondent /
)
Appellee & Cross-Appellant.
)
)
---Third District, Salt Lake Department, 19896424
The Honorable F. Leslie Manker
Attorneys: J.D. Carpenter, Jr., Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Archibald Cox, Salt Lake City, for Appellees
---Before Judges Sutherland, Marshall, and Zane.
SUTHERLAND, Judge:
¶1
This case presents two issues arising from the parties’ performance under a
divorce decree and a recent attempt by the petitioner, Ms. Felix, to have that decree
modified in light of changed circumstances. Ms. Felix and Mr. Sero were married from
1996 to 2005, when they divorced and sole physical custody of their two children was
awarded to Mr. Sero. A number of features of the parties’ relationship and performance
under the divorce decree were raised below, but only two issues are presented on
appeal.
¶2
First, we address an issue of constitutional concern arising from the district court
apparently conditioning Mr. Sero’s custody of his children on his willingness to relocate
to South Carolina. In the years since the parties’ divorce was finalized, Mr. Sero has had
primary physical custody of his children and, by all accounts, has provided stellar care
for his children. Nonetheless, circumstances have changed such that the district court
concluded that it is in the children’s best interests to award primary custody to their
mother, Ms. Felix, who will be moving with the children to South Carolina. The district
court offered to preserve the current custody arrangement were Mr. Sero to move to
South Carolina to live within one hour of Ms. Felix, but Mr. Sero declined that offer. Mr.
Sero appealed the portion of the judgment granting custody to Ms. Felix, arguing that it
infringes his right to interstate travel under the United States Constitution. We agree
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with Mr. Sero and reverse the portion of the district court’s judgment awarding sole
physical custody to Ms. Felix.
¶3
Second, we address the relationship between the doctrine of laches and an
applicable statute of limitations. Although the parties’ divorce decree provides for an
equal distribution of child care expenses, Ms. Felix has borne the lion’s share of costs
associated with child care expenses. This is because, shortly after the decree was
finalized, Ms. Felix transitioned the children into a daycare that cost more each month
than the daycare the children had been attending when the parties were married. Ms.
Felix notified Mr. Sero of the transition and asked that he pay his share of the increased
portion of expenses, but Mr. Sero never made those increased payments. When Ms.
Felix brought this action to modify the decree, she also raised the issue of the unpaid
amounts for child care expenses. Relying on recent precedent from a panel of this court,
the district court concluded that Ms. Felix’s claims for unpaid childcare expenses are
barred by the doctrine of laches. Although we disagree with that rule and urge the Utah
Supreme Court to consider the issue, the district court did not err in adhering to that
precedent. We affirm the judgment of the district court with respect to the laches issue.
BACKGROUND
¶4
This case arises from Ms. Felix’s petition seeking to modify a divorce decree that
has remained unchanged since it was issued in 2005. Under that decree, Mr. Sero was
granted sole physical custody of the parties’ two children. The district court found, and
we agree, that Mr. Sero did an exceptional job as the custodial parent of his children for
the ten years following the entry of that decree. But in early 2015, circumstances
between the parties changed when new professional opportunities presented
themselves to Ms. Felix. 1
The Parties’ Divorce and Mr. Sero’s Time as Caregiver
¶5
Following a marriage that lasted nearly ten years, Mr. Sero and Ms. Felix (Mrs.
Sero at the time) divorced in 2005. This case arises from Ms. Felix’s petition, seeking to
modify the divorce decree and related orders regarding custody and childcare
expenses. Pursuant to the initial decree and related orders, Mr. Sero was granted sole
physical custody of the parties’ two children, who were ages one and three at the time

We pause here to note that, while the record developed in the district court was
voluminous, the two issues raised on appeal are quite narrow compared to the scope of
the proceedings below. Accordingly, we confine our recitation of facts to matters that
are germane to the disposition of this appeal and that are clearly set forth in the district
court’s factual findings, none of which has been contested by either party.
1
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of divorce. In the years following their divorce, the parties very amicably and
conscientiously handled Ms. Felix’s visitation of her children, adhering to mutually
acceptable parenting plans that are consistent with the standards set forth in the
applicable provisions of the Utah Code.
¶6
Nevertheless, in his role as the physical custodian of the children, Mr. Sero
indisputably handled the greater share of the parenting responsibilities. And it is clear
that Mr. Sero handled that responsibility very well. The district court found that Mr.
Sero “consistently acted in the best interests of his children, always putting their needs
ahead of his own.” We note two recent examples of such actions cited by the district
court as being persuasive when making that finding.
¶7
First, in 2013, Mr. Sero’s brother won an all-expenses-paid trip to Bavaria for
himself and a guest, and asked Mr. Sero to join him as the guest. Mr. Sero declined
when it became clear that the trip would conflict with his daughter’s ballet recital and
his son’s little league baseball playoffs. Mr. Sero testified that “I had arranged for the
kids to stay with my parents, and I knew that if I went on the trip, the kids would be
fine, but I also knew that sometimes the most important thing to a kid is to look out in
the audience and know that your dad is there to support you.”
¶8
Second, in 2014, Mr. Sero’s daughter was sick and, after a short stay in the
hospital, required several days of attentive home care. Mr. Sero missed work to provide
that care, which created a hardship because his employment did not provide for sick
leave to cover the extended absence. Mr. Sero traded shifts with co-workers, worked
from home when possible, and navigated that difficult time while fulfilling his
obligations to his employer and to his family. The district court found that “such
delicate balancing of professional and parenting obligations is not glamorous, but is
central to sound parenting.”
¶9
Citing these, and other similar acts, a court-ordered custody evaluator concluded
that it was beyond dispute that Mr. Sero provided a “stable, supportive, and positive
growth environment for the children” and had, “as well as any parent [she had] ever
encountered, balanced the competing obligations of career, child care, and maintaining
positive relationships with an ex-spouse.” The district court credited the evaluator’s
conclusion and indicated that it would take a “strong showing” by Ms. Felix to justify
disrupting that positive status quo.
Ms. Felix’s Professional Opportunity
¶ 10 Ms. Felix was generally present and supportive as her children grew and very
actively parented when called for under the parties’ visitation plans. But it is fair to say
that the parents took different approaches to providing for their children’s well-being.
While Mr. Sero was frequently engaged in the difficult day-to-day effort that comes
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along with being the primary caregiver, Ms. Felix was, in her words “investing in the
children’s future.”
¶ 11 Mr. Sero agreed that Ms. Felix always “did what she said she would do, even if it
was hard to get her to ever go above and beyond, like when [our daughter] got sick.”
Mr. Sero also testified that “[Ms. Felix] has been a good mom, and she makes the most
of the time she spends with our kids; I’m not going to dwell on whether she could have
done some things differently, because we always talked about how to balance things
and she always at least did what she said she would do.” He also said, “so, while I
guess I did a lot more over the last ten years, I won’t complain because that’s how we
always shared the load.”
¶ 12 There was a justifiable reason for Ms. Felix’s different approach to parent-time:
she was pursuing an advanced degree in chemical engineering. That pursuit resulted in
her having less flexibility to respond to unanticipated events and substantially limited
her availability compared to Mr. Sero. That said, the court-appointed custody evaluator
testified that Ms. Felix’s parenting was “also outstanding,” specifically saying that
“parents who juggle relationships with their children while pursuing advanced degrees
have a uniquely difficult task in weighing the benefits of being present for day-to-day
support against the value of laying the groundwork for a better future; Ms. Felix
exercised good judgment in making those decisions and, despite how difficult it must
have been, gave her children a level of attentiveness and support on par with a parent
with fewer obligations or ambitions.”
¶ 13 Ms. Felix’s pursuit has now yielded the benefits she always hoped it would. She
was awarded her Ph.D. in 2015 and, on the strength of the technological breakthroughs
described in her graduate thesis, was courted by several pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Her new professional opportunities were the catalyst for her bringing this case.
Childcare Expenses
¶ 14 Important for this appeal, the parties relied on professional childcare providers
to watch their children while they were at work or, in Ms. Felix’s case, in classes or the
laboratory pursuing her degree. At the time of their divorce, the children were enrolled
at a daycare center near the facility where Ms. Felix worked at the time. Following the
divorce, Ms. Felix transitioned the children to a daycare center that offered a more
robust curriculum, smaller classroom sizes, more stringent accreditation standards, and
generally had a better reputation for providing quality childcare. The new facility also
cost $400/month more than the previous facility. Mr. Sero liked the new facility not
only because of the higher quality of care, but also because it was closer to his home,
making it easier to pick up and drop off the children, which was most frequently his
responsibility.
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¶ 15 The parties’ practice for dividing up expenses had Ms. Felix paying the daycare
and seeking reimbursement from Mr. Sero. Immediately following the transition, Ms.
Felix provided written verification to Mr. Sero of the increased rates and told him to
start paying more to cover his share, but Mr. Sero never did so. Mr. Sero testified that he
received that notice and was aware of the obligation, 2 but did not think it applied when
Ms. Felix made the change without consulting him. Notably, until she sought
reimbursement in these proceedings, Ms. Felix never pressed the matter—she covered
the increased costs without ever receiving the additional contributions from Mr. Sero.
She testified in the district court that “there were always a lot of things that weren’t
running perfectly—payment for this expense or that, swapping weekends even when it
wasn’t convenient—and it just wasn’t always feasible to turn those issues into a fight or
go to court every time something came up.”
The Justification for Relocating the Children
¶ 16 Following publication of her thesis, Ms. Felix garnered substantial attention from
employers in the pharmaceutical industry. Within a few weeks, she received competing
job offers from four different pharmaceutical manufacturers. The specific job
responsibilities and financial compensation varied slightly from offer to offer, but
generally speaking, Ms. Felix had her choice of high-level positions at any of the largest
and most powerful pharmaceutical companies in the United States. All of those offers
would have required her to relocate to a state on the East Coast.
¶ 17 One of these companies was willing to entertain a unique “quality of life”
package that Ms. Felix carefully negotiated, in her words, to “make up for lost time.”
By conceding some financial benefit, she was able to obtain significant benefits related
to the children and her ability to spend time with them. First, the offer entitles her to
substantial periods of leave and a structured work schedule. Until the children graduate
high school, Ms. Felix may take leave for two weeks at a time, six times per year. And
when she is not on leave, Ms. Felix will be required to work no more than 40 hours per
week. The negotiated employment arrangement also included a generous policy for
sick-leave (above and beyond the scheduled leave), in case health problems arise again
for either of the children. Second, the company also agreed to cover the costs of tuition
and extra-curricular activities at any one of several private schools identified by the
company. Third, the children would be entitled to free enrollment for two different
study-abroad experiences during summers when they are in high school.
¶ 18 The key limitation to this offer is the requirement that Ms. Felix must relocate to
South Carolina to take advantage of these benefits. The company’s ability to cover
tuition costs results from certain contractual relationships that it has entered into with
private schools near its headquarters. The study-abroad experiences require attendance,
Mr. Sero concedes the notice was adequate under Utah Code section 78B-12-214.
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in person, at weekly training sessions with group leaders and fellow travelers for the
eight weeks leading up to the departure of the trip at the beginning of each summer.
And while the company does not prohibit Ms. Felix from traveling during her twoweek leave periods, they “strongly encourage” her to remain in the immediate vicinity
of their headquarters because of the possibility—however unlikely—that she will be
required to assist with highly technical, and highly time-sensitive, chemistry. 3
¶ 19 The district court’s findings gave “no meaningful weight” to the compensation
structure Ms. Felix had negotiated, on the basis that modifications to the parties’ child
support order could effectuate a redistribution of this new wealth, regardless of which
parent was awarded custody. But the district court found the other aspects of the new
arrangement to weigh heavily in favor of modifying the custody arrangement. The
court relied on two key pieces of testimony. First, the court was persuaded by the
custody evaluator’s testimony that the proposed structure was perhaps the best
conceivable approach to childhood development for teenagers:
Based on our current understanding of the developmental
needs of teenagers, I urge the court to grant custody to Ms.
Felix. Putting teens in good schools positions them for future
success. Participating in varied extra-curricular activities not
only contributes to their happiness and growth, but also sets
them up to succeed outside of a classroom. The study abroad
experiences raise cultural awareness and instill in teenagers a
sense of their role in the world, at a time in their lives when
that understanding will have a meaningful impact. And as to
cultivating the mother-child relationship, all of our science
shows that nothing is more likely to foster positive bonding
than frequent and prolonged periods of time together. Where
it’s possible to structure parent-child interactions in the way

The court pressed Ms. Felix on this issue, because it was concerned that the two-week
leave periods were “illusory if you’re always being called back to the office.” Ms. Felix
explained the scientific reasons why this kind of urgent need would be unlikely to arise,
but why it would be catastrophic if it did and she could not personally report to the lab
for mitigation. She explained that, to her, the strong encouragement of her employer
meant that no negative consequences would result merely because she travelled, but
that if she were to travel and something were to go wrong that could have been
prevented by her quick intervention, it would cost her the job. The court credited her
explanation and concluded that the limitation is reasonable and also not likely to
interfere with the leave time that has been offered. For purposes of this appeal, it
suffices to say that no one has challenged the district court’s conclusion.
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Ms. Felix contemplates, our studies show there is no better
recipe for a positive relationship.
If the court had been ambivalent at that point, additional testimony from Mr. Sero
pushed the court’s reasoning along. Mr. Sero testified that:
I’m not a fool. I understand that this means she’ll expose our
kids to opportunities that I could never give them. Even if the
money wasn’t an issue, it’s a fact of my life that I’m not going
to be able to spend weeks at a time with my kids or put them
in private schools like these, or send them to Europe in the
summer.
¶ 20 The district court, stating that it was struggling with the difficulty of the decision
at hand, presented Mr. Sero with a “compromise offer.” The court indicated that it
could not ignore the benefits that the children would enjoy from their mother’s new
arrangement, or the equity of now giving Ms. Felix the opportunity to build the kind of
relationship with the children that Mr. Sero had been building for ten years. The court
stated that, “after years of effort to build this better life for her children, it would be
very unfortunate if the court gave so much weight to the status quo that it would not
position the family to take advantage of the new benefits being made available or the
chance for the children to build an even stronger relationship with their mother.” The
court nevertheless expressed its reluctance to disrupt the current custody arrangement,
which had “provided a positive and stable environment for the children.”
¶ 21 The court then stated: “We could resolve this very easily if you would be willing
to move to South Carolina and live a short distance from Ms. Felix and the children.
Then all of these benefits would be made available, but you could also remain the
primary custodian.” Mr. Sero responded by saying that there “is just no way I can leave
my job, my family, my home, my friends, and the life I have built in Utah.” The district
court then inquired “what if that’s the only way that it makes sense for you to retain
custody of the children, is it something you could do?” Mr. Sero stated, “even then,
your honor, I don’t know how I would make it work because it would be such a
financial disruption and it would make it impossible for me to have relationships with
people in Utah and, besides, I can’t imagine being in a position where, if she moves
again, I’d have to pick up and move just to stay close to her and the kids.”
The Decision Below
¶ 22 In their arguments before the district court, the parties each presented the issues
that are raised on appeal. Mr. Sero’s counsel argued that “the constitution requires the
court to give some extra level of consideration to Mr. Sero’s choice not to relocate,” and
that “there’s a fundamental right to interstate travel, and that includes the right to
choose where to settle and find a job, or the right not to be compelled to resettle and
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find a new job, at least not without a showing of compelling circumstances and narrow
tailoring.” Counsel continued that “the other side of the coin is Mr. Sero’s constitutional
interest in being a parent to his children, which is also infringed if the court takes that
right away just because of his exercise of his constitutional rights regarding travel.”
¶ 23 The district court rejected Mr. Sero’s arguments, concluding that “the
constitutional right to travel does not require specialized consideration in child custody
cases.” The court stated that the relevant statutes require consideration “of the
children’s best interests, not the parents’ preferences regarding residence or
relationships.” The court also stated that it was “ironic that Mr. Sero would cite a right
to travel in support of his desire to stay in one place” and that it “[could] not conclude
that a constitutional right to travel operates in the way Mr. Sero claims it should.”
¶ 24 The district court found that the best interests of the children would be served by
granting Ms. Felix sole physical custody. The court explained its decision as follows:
Mr. Sero, I very reluctantly transition physical custody away
from you and to Ms. Felix. The court is keenly aware of the
powerful bond you have formed with your children and the
high quality of care that you have provided for most of their
lives. And absent profound changes in circumstances like
those presented here, I imagine we’d be discussing a different
outcome.
But there is no denying just how substantially circumstances
have changed. You yourself credited the unique
opportunities being presented by Ms. Felix’s new situation.
And the custody evaluator explained how positive the
transition promises to be for your children.
I’m also crediting the fact that your children are old enough
to process the change, and that they told the custody
evaluator that although they are anxious at the prospect of
relocating, changing schools, and not being able to live
primarily with you, they are also excited by the prospect of
suddenly having much more time to spend with their mother
and doing so in a new environment with new opportunities.
This is the closest of calls, but on balance the court cannot
ignore the benefits that will flow to your children by virtue of
this new situation.
¶ 25 The court modified the existing custody order to award sole physical custody to
Ms. Felix. Citing “confidence arising from the parties’ ability to work well together in
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the past,” the court directed the parties to work out a mutually acceptable plan for
visitation that would “entitle Mr. Sero to at least as much time with the children as Ms.
Felix had enjoyed under the old order.”
¶ 26 With respect to the issue of unpaid childcare expenses, Mr. Sero argued that Ms.
Felix should be barred by the doctrine of laches from attempting to recover payments
after waiting nearly ten years to bring the issue to the court’s attention. Mr. Sero argued
that he had been injured by Ms. Felix’s lack of diligence because, by waiting nearly ten
years to do anything about the unpaid amounts, she had allowed the outstanding
amount attributable to Mr. Sero to rise to nearly $24,000. If Ms. Felix had pursued the
issue sooner, Mr. Sero argued, he could have invoked the court’s continuing jurisdiction
over the child support order and sought a redistribution of the obligation based on the
fact that Ms. Felix unilaterally elected to incur the expense. Ms. Felix argued that, where
a statute of limitations has been enacted by the legislature, the statute of limitations
should control, and equitable defenses should not be available.
¶ 27 The district court, citing Veysey v. Veysey, 2014 UT App 264, 339 P.3d 131
(referred to herein as Veysey I), and Veysey v. Nelson, 2017 UT App 77, 397 P.3d 846
(referred to herein as Veysey II) reluctantly agreed with Mr. Sero. The court explained
that, like Ms. Felix, the court believed the legislative intent that led to the adoption of
the statute of limitations should control the time period for bringing a claim. But, the
district court concluded, if the defense of laches was available—as this court’s precedent
makes clear that it is—then Mr. Sero had met the elements for asserting laches as a
defense. Noting Ms. Felix’s disagreement with the standard being applied, the court
stated that she should “raise [her] concerns with the higher courts.”
¶ 28 Both parties appealed. Mr. Sero claims the district court erred in awarding
custody to Ms. Felix without giving due consideration to his constitutional right to
travel. Ms. Felix claims that the Veysey cases were wrongly decided with respect to
laches, and that laches should not have been a defense available to Mr. Sero in opposing
her claims for unpaid childcare expenses. We reverse the district court’s opinion with
respect to the constitutional issue, but reluctantly affirm with respect to the availability
of the laches defense.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 29 It is true that the district court’s determination of what is in the best interests of
children in a custody dispute is entitled to deference and overturned only if we
determine that the district court abused its discretion. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648
(Utah 1988). But Mr. Sero does not argue that the district court abused its discretion in
undertaking that difficult examination in this case; he argues that a unique legal
standard applies when the district court undertakes that inquiry in the face of a
potential infringement on a custodial parent’s rights to interstate travel. That raises the
question of whether the district court applied the correct legal standard, which is a
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question we review de novo, without deference to the district court. See Mawhinney v.
City of Draper, 2014 UT 54, ¶ 6, 342 P.3d 262.
¶ 30 The question of whether the defense of laches is available and the application of
a statute of limitations is a legal question that we review for correctness. Veysey II, 2017
UT App 77, ¶ 5, 397 P.3d 846; Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 52, ¶ 4, 979 P.2d 823.
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ANALYSIS
I.

The Constitutional Right to Interstate Travel Requires
Special Analysis in Certain Child Custody Cases

¶ 31 We agree with Mr. Sero that the United States Constitution protects a
fundamental right to travel, which includes the right to choose one’s state of residence,
and that the district court erred by not giving due weight to Mr. Sero’s constitutional
right. 4 The constitutional right to travel is both “firmly embedded in [constitutional]
jurisprudence,” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999), and notoriously difficult to pin
down. In different contexts, the United States Supreme Court has found support for the
right in the privileges and immunities clause, the due process clause, the commerce
clause, or some other implicit right that is “so elementary . . . [as] to be a necessary
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created.” Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 630–31 (1969); see also Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501–02 (privileges and immunities
clause); Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418–19 & n.13 (1981) (citing Williams v. Fears, 179
U.S. 270, 274 (1900)) (due process clause); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758–59
(1966) (commerce clause). We need not distill the source of the right any more clearly
than has the United States Supreme Court. We take our direction from that Court’s
pronouncement that “[a]lthough there have been recurring differences in emphasis
within the Court as to the source of the constitutional right of interstate travel, there is
no need here to canvass those differences further. All have agreed that the right exists.”
Guest, 383 U.S. at 759.
¶ 32 We also agree with Mr. Sero that the right includes the right to be free from state
interference in choosing where to reside. A long line of cases has limited states’ ability
to enact residency requirements that would inhibit an attempt by a citizen of one state
to settle in a new state. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502. And although those cases apply to
citizens seeking to change their state of residence, we cannot fathom that the rule would
not also protect a citizen seeking to be free from state interference in his desire to
remain in his established state of residence. Where the Supreme Court has stated that “a
citizen of the United States has a perfect constitutional right to go to and reside in any
State he chooses, and to claim citizenship there[],” we take the Court at its word. Id. at
503–04 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 48 (1872)).
¶ 33 Applying the foregoing precedent, a number of state courts have enacted rules
for analyzing the impact of a parent’s right to travel when analyzing custody
We note that this issue was raised in a factually similar case, but was not resolved
because it had not been preserved by the appellant in that case. Vanderzon v.
Vanderzon, 2017 UT App 150, ¶¶ 30–31, 402 P.3d 219. The conclusion of the court of
appeals in that case, that the right was not so clearly established that the district court’s
failure to account for it constituted plain error, does not impact our analysis in this case,
where the issue is preserved. Id. ¶¶ 32–36.
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determinations, or have concluded that their respective custody-determination statutes
require consideration of the right. Fredman v. Fredman, 960 S.2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007); In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135 (Colo. 2005); LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607
N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1991);
Braun v. Headley, 750 A.2d 624 (2000). We agree with Mr. Sero that the United States
Constitution requires that the courts of Utah accommodate his fundamental right when
making determinations regarding the custody of his children. The district court failed to
do so. In fact, the district court appears to have required Mr. Sero to forfeit his right to
travel, expressed through Mr. Sero’s choice regarding where to reside, in order to
maintain custody of his children. This was error that requires reversal.
¶ 34 Having concluded that the district court erred, we are compelled to offer some
guidance regarding how to handle this inquiry on remand. As the parties have pointed
out to us in their briefing, states take varying approaches to analyzing this issue. We
here examine the various approaches and explain why we think the rule in Utah should
be that the district court must weigh the parents’ rights to travel against the best
interests of the children as a means of harmonizing competing constitutional concerns
and the statutory standard for making custody determinations.
¶ 35 We find the analysis of the Supreme Court of Colorado to be very helpful both in
surveying the competing approaches to this issue and also in setting a workable rule.
In In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 137–38, the mother and primary custodian of
the couple’s child sought modification of the applicable parenting time order in order to
allow her to relocate out of state with the parties’ child. The father opposed the change.
Id. The district court in that case rejected the proposed change, which would have had
the effect of forcing the mother not to relocate, or to undertake the move and forego the
parenting time to which she was entitled under the plan. Id. at 138. The mother argued
that the decision, and the way the competing interests were weighed, violated her
constitutional right to travel. Id.
¶ 36 The Colorado Supreme Court surveyed three different state approaches before
settling on the rule that would apply in Colorado. First, the court noted that at least one
state protects the parent’s right to travel above competing interests. The court described
the “Wyoming Approach” as one where the “right to travel is absolute,” such that a
parent seeking to modify a custody determination to prevent the custodial parent from
moving out of state with the couple’s child could not rely on the changed circumstances
resulting from the move as a basis for modifying the divorce decree. Id. at 143 (citing
Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1999)). The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the
approach, concluding that it fails to adequately account for the rights of the noncustodial parent and replaces the fact-driven inquiry into a child’s best interests with a
presumption in favor of continuing custody for the relocating parent. The Wyoming
Supreme Court has since overruled Watt. Arnott v. Arnott, 293 P.3d 440 (Wyo. 2012).
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We reject the approach easily—in its attempt to honor the custodial parent’s right to
travel, it disregards the competing right of the non-custodial parent.
¶ 37 Second, the court noted that at least one state disregards the parent’s right to
travel and focuses solely on the best interests of the child. In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113
P.3d at 143–45 (citing LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d at 163–64). The court described the
Minnesota approach as one where the best interests of the child are deemed to
constitute a compelling state interest. Id. at 144. In light of constitutional jurisprudence
that permits the subjugation of even fundamental rights in service of a compelling state
interest, this approach reflects the determination that parental rights must always yield
to what is in a child’s best interests. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court declined to adopt
this approach. Id. at 145. Its decision was based, in part, on unique features of
Colorado’s custody determination statutes, but it also found persuasive the United
States Supreme Court’s statement that “’in th[e] highly sensitive constitutional area’” of
fundamental rights “’only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give
occasion for permissible limitation.’” Id. at 144–45 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 406 (1963)).
¶ 38 We find the Minnesota approach appealing in its simplicity, but this very case
demonstrates how that rule also falls short of the necessary level of constitutional
protection. Certainly, the Minnesota approach is easy to administer; the analysis
requires no inquiry into the parent’s constitutional rights because the court’s
determination of what is in the child’s best interests will always justify infringing the
right to travel. There is some analytical appeal in the approach as well. In Utah, many
facets of parental rights are fundamental, such that they can be overcome only upon a
showing of a compelling state interest. Jones v. Jones, 2015 UT 84, ¶ 26 & n.5, 359 P.3d
603. By implication, then, whenever a custody determination limits one parent’s rights
because of a best-interests determination, that determination must have reflected a
compelling interest.
¶ 39 But although we find the Minnesota approach superficially appealing, we
ultimately conclude it is inadequate to balance very substantial constitutional concerns.
For instance, if a court concludes that the best interests of the children are going to be
served equally well by either custody determination, then the Minnesota approach
would give as much weight to a coin toss as it would to the parents’ rights. There is no
conceivable justification in that hypothetical situation for not analyzing whether one
parent’s right to travel is weighty enough to tip the otherwise balanced scales. It follows
that if, as in this case, the best-interests determination is the “closest of calls,” a showing
by one parent of a particularly weighty interest in the right to travel may outweigh the
marginal difference between how a child’s best interests will be served in competing
custody situations.
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¶ 40 That brings us to the third approach analyzed by the Colorado Supreme Court,
which was articulated by the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision in Jaramillo. In re
Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 145–47 (citing Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 307–09). That
approach requires courts to balance “the majority time parent’s right to travel and the
state’s concerns in protecting the best interests of the child, but also the minority
parent’s right to maintain close association and frequent contact with the child.” Id. at
146. The Ciesluk court quoted approvingly the New Mexico Supreme Court’s
conclusion that shifting burdens and creating presumptions “does violence to both
parents’ rights [and] jeopardizes the true goal of determining what in fact is in the
child’s best interests.” Id. at 146 (quoting Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 305). The better
approach, the Ciesluk court concluded, requires that the district court undertake the
“admittedly difficult task of determining, on the facts, how best to accommodate the
interests of all parties before the court, both parents and children.” Id. (quoting
Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 305).
¶ 41 We find the New Mexico approach, which was adopted by the Colorado
Supreme Court and has also been adopted in Maryland, to establish the appropriate
standard. Id.; Braun, 750 A.2d 624. We are persuaded that this approach provides the
appropriate means of accounting for competing constitutional interests, because it is the
best mechanism for analyzing the rights of both parents to travel in the context of the
best interests of the child.
¶ 42 Notably, when undertaking this evaluation, the court may very well reach the
same result it has already reached in this case. Although the constitutional right to
travel was asserted by Mr. Sero, Ms. Felix also enjoys that right. Here, she seeks to
exercise that right to take advantage of a new job opportunity in another state. It may be
that, in light of all the facts and circumstances, exercise of the right by Ms. Felix is as
important to her as Mr. Sero’s right to stay in Utah is to him. But there is a meaningful
chance that it is not—after all, the job opportunities that catalyzed Ms. Felix’s decision
to move were presented to her with little searching. Perhaps she is willing to keep
looking for something closer to Mr. Sero. Perhaps she is simply not as tied to this job
opportunity as Mr. Sero is tied to Utah. Or perhaps she even prefers to stay in Utah but
is undertaking the change very reluctantly. The fact that these issues were not
developed below is a symptom of the district court applying the wrong standard.
Rather than analyze Mr. Sero’s and Ms. Felix’s constitutional rights to travel, the district
court appears to have disregarded them. In fact, it seems to have suggested that Mr.
Sero could retain custody only if he was willing to give up his right to travel. This
constitutes error that requires remand and reconsideration of the various interests at
hand, in a manner consistent with the test we have outlined here.
II.
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¶ 43 We are bound by precedent to affirm the district court’s decision that the
doctrine of laches forecloses Ms. Felix’s claims for unpaid child support, even though
such claims would not be foreclosed by the applicable statute of limitations. 5 Our
decision rests on application of the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis.
¶ 44 This court is “bound by [its own] previous decisions as well as the decisions of
the Utah Supreme Court.” State v. Tenorio, 2007 UT App 92, ¶ 9, 156 P.3d 854. The Utah
Supreme Court has provided clear direction regarding both “vertical” stare decisis and
“horizontal” stare decisis. With respect to the former, “[v]ertical stare decisis . . .
compels a court to follow strictly the decisions rendered by a higher court.” Id. (quoting
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994)). With respect to the latter,
horizontal stare decisis requires that “the first decision by a court on a particular
question of law governs later decisions by the same court.” Id. (quoting State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993)). This court also has little latitude to overrule
its own prior decisions. While the Utah Supreme Court may, in certain carefully
measured circumstances, overrule its prior decisions, one panel of this court does not
have the power to overrule another panel unless the earlier decision was “clearly
erroneous or conditions have changed so as to render the prior decision inapplicable.”
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 n.3.
¶ 45 The precise question raised here—whether the defense of laches may be raised in
a case where the claims asserted would not be barred by the applicable statute of
limitations—was clearly presented to and decided by a panel of this court in Veysey I,
2014 UT App at 264, ¶ 18. There, the court stated that, if facts supported application of
the doctrine of laches “a determination that . . . claims are barred would not necessarily
be inappropriate,” even where the statute of limitations would not bar the claims. 6 Id.
Perhaps because she is aware of the deference we would afford the district court, Ms.
Felix does not challenge the trial court’s factual findings related to the laches issue, or
the trial court’s conclusion that, in light of those facts, the elements necessary to sustain
the laches defense have been met. Rather, Ms. Felix challenges the purely legal
determination that laches is available as a defense in this case.
5

We do pause at the court’s use of the phrase “not necessarily,” which might be read to
suggest that there are at least some circumstances where laches should be unavailable.
Veysey I, 2014 UT App at 264, ¶ 18. But if there was uncertainty about the breadth of
that holding, it was resolved when the case was presented to the court again after
remand. In Veysey I, this court rejected the application of the laches defense because it
was not supported by adequate factual findings. Id. On remand, the district court made
the contemplated factual findings. Veysey II, 2017 UT App 77, ¶ 14. When the
availability of the laches defense was presented as an issue again in the appeal
following remand, the court of appeals spoke with much more clarity, holding that
“because laches may apply in situations where the statute of limitations has not yet run,
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¶ 46 Notably, the facts in this case track quite closely the facts in the Veysey series of
cases. As in this case, those cases involved a parent seeking recovery of child care
expenses based on daycare costs having increased several years before the filing of a
claim. Veysey I, 2014 UT App 264, ¶¶ 2–3. We can find no principled basis for applying
a legal rule in this case that differs from the one announced by this court in the Veysey
decisions. The issues are the same and the factual circumstances are closely analogous,
so that the rule is being applied in precisely the manner contemplated in the Veysey
decisions. We must affirm.
¶ 47 Despite the foregoing, we have our doubts about the holding in Veysey II. The
appellant in Veysey II raised a number of persuasive arguments against the availability
of a laches defense. For instance, Utah Code section 78B-12-109 states that the defenses
of waiver and estoppel are not available in certain actions for the payment of child
support, a rule that applied in Veysey I due to the posture in that case. Id. ¶ 18 n.6. The
appellant in Veysey I argued that that statute foreclosed application of the laches
defense. Id. The court disagreed, recounting the legal distinction between estoppel and
laches, and “decline[d] to read” estoppel and waiver “more broadly” to include
“laches.” Id. Yet, is it not “the primary objective of statutory interpretation to ascertain
the intent of the legislature?” Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 10, 387 P.3d 1000 (internal
quotation marks omitted). We are not as persuaded as this court’s prior panel that the
legislature intended the definition of estoppel to be so narrow that it would not include
the doctrine of laches. See, e.g., 20C AmJur Pl. & Pr. Forms Quieting Title § 67 (referring
to the doctrine as “Estoppel by laches”); 6 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 31:2 (5th ed.) (same).
¶ 48 Relatedly, the appellant in Veysey II argued that the application of laches where
the legislature has established a statute of limitations violates the separation of powers
doctrine. Veysey II, 2017 UT App 77, ¶ 7 n.4. This court refused to relinquish its
traditional equitable powers “absent an inescapable inference to the contrary.” Id. But if
the meaning of Utah Code section 78b-12-109 is not as narrow as the court’s
interpretation, it seems to us that that statute is the “inescapable inference” that gives
rise to separation of powers concerns.
¶ 49 Finally, the Veysey II court cites case law from the Utah Supreme Court in a way
that suggests that it felt its conclusion was inescapable as a matter of precedent. Id. ¶ 7.
While we see no basis for distinguishing this case from Veysey II, we certainly think the
holding in the Veysey decisions is distinguishable from the cases upon which those
decisions relied. For instance, the panel in Veysey II cites Insight Assets v. Farias, for the
the existence of a statute of limitations does not . . . automatically preclude application
of the laches doctrine.” Id. ¶ 7.
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rule that “[t]he doctrine of laches may apply in equity, whether or not a statute of
limitation also applies and whether or not an applicable statute of limitation has been
satisfied.” Veysey II, 2017 UT App 77, ¶ 7 (quoting Insight Assets v. Farias, 2013 UT 47,
¶ 18, 321 P.3d 1021). But that language from Insight Assets relates to the application of
the purchase money rule in a mortgage foreclosure action, which the court points out
are “equitable in nature and therefore subject to the equitable defense of laches.” Insight
Assets, 2013 UT 47, ¶ 18. Veysey II also quotes Borland v. Chandler for the proposition
that Utah has “abolished any formal distinction between law and equity.” Veysey II,
2017 UT App 77, ¶ 7 (quoting Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1987)). But
Borland was decided in 1987 and yet, in 2013, the Utah Supreme Court referred to that
very distinction in its decision in Insight Assets, leaving us unsure whether something
beyond the “formal distinction” might still be at work in the interplay between
equitable doctrines and statutory rules.
¶ 50 Were we deciding this issue in the first instance today, free of the binding force
of the Veysey decisions, we have some doubt about whether we would reach the same
result. Those doubts are undoubtedly cold comfort to Ms. Felix. Perhaps by taking the
time in this case to call attention to our own uncertainty, we will better position Ms.
Felix or some future litigant to obtain review of this issue by the Utah Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
¶ 51 We affirm the district court’s decision that Ms. Felix’s claim for unpaid childcare
expenses was barred by the doctrine of laches. But we reverse the district court’s order
granting sole physical custody to Ms. Felix, on the basis that the court’s determination
failed to account for Mr. Sero’s constitutional right to travel. Accordingly, we reverse
and remand for additional proceedings consistent with the standard we have set forth
in this opinion.

____________________________________
George Sutherland,
Judge
---¶ 52

I CONCUR:
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____________________________________
Thurgood Marshall, Associate Presiding Judge

----
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Zane, J., (dissenting in part and concurring in part):
¶ 53 I dissent with respect to the majority’s conclusion that the district court’s analysis
of the custody matter was constitutionally infirm. I concur with the majority’s decision
insofar as the majority holds that the doctrine of laches was available to Mr. Sero as a
defense in this case. But I write separately because I do not share the majority’s doubts
regarding whether Veysey was correctly decided.
¶ 54 With respect to the constitutional question, I would affirm on the basis that the
Minnesota approach, where the best interests of the children are the paramount
consideration, is the better rule. See LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2000). And because I believe that rule is, in effect, the rule applied by the district
court in this case, I would affirm the district court’s judgment. In particular, I am
persuaded that the best interests of the children is a compelling interest that is adequate
to override the competing interests of the parents. Were that not the case, every custody
determination would be constitutionally infirm because every custody determination
would limit parental rights on some lesser showing, which the Utah Supreme Court
instructs us is not allowed. See Jones v. Jones, 2015 UT 84, ¶ 26, 359 P.3d 603.
¶ 55 Further, I cannot see how any court can weigh the value of one parent’s right to
travel against the other parent’s right to travel. How is one parent’s right weightier than
the other? Perhaps the court means that, on balance, one parent is less likely to be
harmed by losing that right, but that seems to me to be poor justification for a
constitutional infringement. I am persuaded that the best-interests determination that
has long been the bellwether indicator of custody determinations is a sufficiently
adequate means of advancing the state’s interest in protecting children in custody
disputes that that determination, without more, is constitutionally adequate.
¶ 56 Regarding Veysey, I believe the majority in this case strains to find hypertechnical and artificially limited ways of parsing language from prior cases in order to
sow doubt where none need exist. It is beyond dispute that the old distinctions between
law and equity have been abolished. Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1987)
(citing Utah R. Civ. P. 2). The fact that Utah courts might sometimes refer to the original
nature of certain causes of action, as was the case in Insight Assets v. Farias, 2013 UT 47,
¶ 18, 321 P.3d 1021, does not change the fact that the distinctions are no longer
operative.
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¶ 57 I think Veysey was rightly decided, but even if reasonable minds could differ
with respect to that conclusion, I see no basis for broadcasting doubts about whether it
should be followed, or taking the unusual step of urging the Utah Supreme Court to
overrule this very case.

____________________________________
Charles S. Zane, Presiding Judge
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